top of page

Turkish Defense Industry Faces Cyber Espionage Threat

Turkey’s unique geopolitical position and growing defense industry have once again been highlighted through a newly detected and highly targeted cyberattack identified by Arctic Wolf. In its report published on July 23, 2025, Arctic Wolf analyzed a custom-developed cyber operation by an Indian-origin cyber espionage group, aimed specifically at manufacturers of precision-guided missile systems in Turkey.

 

Turkey’s development of a wide spectrum of technologies from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and electronic warfare systems to guided missiles and cyber defense solutions has made it a focal point not only for allied nations but also for rival actors. Cyber espionage operations that compromise engineering projects, R&D efforts, and strategic decision-making processes can lead to consequences that are not only economic, but also military and diplomatic.

 

In this context, the timing of the cyberattack that clearly targeted the Turkish defense industry offers insight into its purpose: the attack by the cyber group “Dropping Elephant” took place amid rising tensions between India and Pakistan, and during a period of strengthening defense cooperation between Turkey and Pakistan. This demonstrates how cyber espionage is increasingly used as a geopolitical tool of aggression.

 

Threat Actor (APT) Profile

Known as

Dropping Elephant, Patchwork, Chinastrats, Monsoon, Quilted Tiger, Thirsty Gemini

Country of origin

India

Target regions

Middle East, East Asia, Southeast Asia, China, USA

Target industries

Defense, government, aviation, energy, finance

Attack methods

Spear-phishing, watering hole, vulnerability exploits

First observed in 2015, Dropping Elephant is a cyber threat group known for targeting military, political, economic, and government-linked institutions operating internationally, primarily in China and Southeast Asia. In 2018, it was also observed conducting phishing campaigns against U.S.-based think tanks.

 

Due to the group’s habit of copy-pasting code snippets from online forums, their operations are also referred to as “Patchwork”. Once inside a target system, the group first exfiltrates data such as documents, screenshots, and user credentials to its command and control (C2) servers. If the stolen information is deemed valuable, they deploy more advanced malware in a second stage.

In its attack on Turkish defense contractors, Dropping Elephant attempted to achieve persistence by embedding malicious code in seemingly legitimate documents and software, supported by social engineering techniques.

 

Scope and Significance of the Threat

The attack, which occurred in July 2025, began with convincingly crafted emails sent to specific targets. Posing as corporate invitations to a conference, these emails contained a .LNK (Windows shortcut) file that appeared harmless at first glance.

 

When the user opened the LNK file, it executed a PowerShell command in the background, which fetched and launched a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) from remote servers.

 

Among the downloaded files was a PDF file used as visual bait, while the malware silently performed operations in the background. The PowerShell script also attempted to wipe system logs to hide its tracks.

 

The deployed RAT granted the attacker capabilities such as:

  • Keystroke logging

  • Screenshot capture

  • File upload/download

  • System and network reconnaissance

  • Remote command execution

 

All activity took place over covert C2 connections. Dropping Elephant also employed encryption and temporary file-sharing services to evade detection. What began as phishing ultimately evolved into a multi-layered, covert espionage operation.

 

Notably, the C2 domain mimicked the TÜBİTAK-backed Pardus project, a clear indicator of targeted social engineering. The attack strategy was tailored with careful attention to geography and international developments, reaffirming that such operations are calculated and politically motivated.

 

According to Arctic Wolf, this technique is especially useful when target users are operating remotely and the sensitive data resides on separate servers, for example, secure diagrams or confidential documents. This makes screen-capturing functionality vital.

 

Cyber Espionage Protection in the Defense Sector

This attack by Dropping Elephant represents a geopolitically motivated, sophisticated cyber-espionage campaign directly targeting Turkey's ascent in defense technologies. It poses a threat not just to a single organization, but to Turkey’s national security and strategic defense capacity.

 

To prevent such attacks, email security gateways serve as the first line of defense, blocking malicious attachments and phishing attempts before they reach the user. Combined with advanced sandbox environments, these solutions can neutralize unknown or zero-day malware in real time.


With modern YARA rules and threat indicators (IOCs), organizations can build true cyber resilience against emerging threats. This incident underscores the critical role of both technologies.

 

How DataMessageX Could Have Prevented the Dropping Elephant Attack

DataMessageX, a multi-layered email security gateway, delivers enterprise-grade protection against modern messaging threats. It combines high precision, flexibility, and centralized control in a single robust platform.

 

YARA Profile

YARA is a rule-based system for identifying files or content based on structural and behavioral patterns. It detects malware and exploit kits not through static signatures, but by analyzing how they are constructed and behave.


Most email gateways do not support YARA, as it is commonly used in EDR, sandboxing, or forensic systems. However, DataMessageX does. Its YARA profile module can behaviorally analyze email content and attachments.


With YARA support, DataMessageX can:

  • Detect malicious PowerShell scripts embedded in .lnk files

  • Map obfuscated or encoded malware patterns through behavioral matching

  • Identify even zero-day or signature-less RATs if they exhibit known malicious behavior


In the specific case of Dropping Elephant, if YARA profiling were enabled in DataMessageX and proper rules defined, the malicious .LNK file would have been intercepted upon arrival.

 

Post-Attack Response

If the phishing email had bypassed initial filters and reached user inboxes, DataMessageX + mSOAR (Analytics) and Microsoft Exchange integration would have enabled a controlled incident response.

 

Via the integrated mSOAR dashboard, analysts can:

  • Review the full email content, headers, attachments, and suspicious URLs

  • Analyze sender domains, delivery path (trace), MIME structure, and email behavior

 

With Exchange integration, the system provides real-time visibility:

  • Who opened the malicious email

  • Who clicked embedded links

  • Who downloaded or executed attachments

 

If needed, the malicious email can be centrally recalled from user inboxes via the DataMessageX console, minimizing spread and accelerating remediation.

 

This visibility and control empower incident response teams on both the analytical and operational fronts. DataMessageX acts not only as a filter, but as a post-breach threat management platform.

 

Advanced Sandbox Solution: DataSecureX

DataSecureX is an AI-powered sandbox designed to protect your systems against evolving malware threats.

 

Fueled by threat intelligence from DFX IntelRoom, it leverages billions of:

  • Hashes

  • YARA rules

  • URLs

  • Domains

  • IOCs

 

It integrates with your existing security stack via ICAP or REST API, delivering comprehensive protection against advanced malware.

 

Key features include:

  • Microsoft Exchange integration

  • File sharing protection over network drives

  • Human behavior emulation

  • Auto-scaling virtual machines

  • Extensive integration capabilities

  • AI-powered malware detection

 

Rules & Indicators

 

YARA Hunting and Detection Rule:

rule Dropping_Elephant_RAT {
	meta:
		description = "Rule for detecting Dropping Elephant RAT"
		last_modified = "2025-07-16"
		author = "The Arctic Wolf Labs team"
		version = "1.0"
		sha256 = "8b6acc087e403b913254dd7d99f09136dc54fa45cf3029a8566151120d34d1c2"
	strings:
		$a1 = "%s=33up$!!$%s$!!$%s" ascii wide
		$a2 = "%s=uep$@$%s$@$%s" ascii wide
		$a3 = "%s=%s$!!$%s" ascii wide
		$a4 = "%s=%s$!!$%s$!!$%s" ascii wide
		$a5 = "%s=%s!$$$!%s" ascii wide
		$a6 = "%s=%s!@!%s!@!%lu" ascii wide
		$a7 = "%s=%s!$$$!%s!$$$!%s" ascii wide
		$a8 = "%s=error@$$@%s@$$@%s" ascii wide
		$a9 = "%s=%s$!!$%s$!!$%s$!!$%s$!!$%s$!!$%s$!!$" ascii wide
	condition:
		(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and (filesize < 1MB) and (all of ($a*))
}

 

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs):

 

File Indicators

Name

SHA-256

Unmanned_Vehicle_Systems_Conference_2025_In_Istanbul.lnk

341f27419becc456b52d6fbe2d223e8598065ac596fa8dec23cc722726a28f62

Unmanned_Vehicle_Systems_Conference_2025_In_Istanbul.pdf

588021b5553838fae5498de40172d045b5168c8e608b8929a7309fd08abfaa93

lake (libvlc.dll)

2cd2a4f1fc7e4b621b29d41e42789c1365e5689b4e3e8686b80f80268e2c0d8d

vlc.log

89ec9f19958a442e9e3dd5c96562c61229132f3acb539a6b919c15830f403553

Decrypted Shellcode

8b6acc087e403b913254dd7d99f09136dc54fa45cf3029a8566151120d34d1c2

 

Scheduled Task

saps "C:\Windows\Tasks\Winver" -a "/Create", '/sc', 'minute', '/tn', 'NewErrorReport', '/tr', "C:\Windows\Tasks\vlc", '/f';

 

Network Indicators

  • expouav[.]org – Dropping website

  • roseserve[.]org – C2 server

 

Mutant Object

Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\ghjghkj

 

 

bottom of page