Preventing Lateral Movement Between SCADA and Corporate Networks

In industrial environments, the boundary between SCADA systems and corporate IT networks is often assumed to be secure. Yet in many architectures, these two domains are more connected than most realize. Whether through shared infrastructure, reporting interfaces, or vendor access, attackers increasingly exploit these connections to move laterally between operational and enterprise zones.

When a threat actor gains a foothold in one environment, the next objective is almost always the same: pivot deeper. Without hardened isolation, the barrier between SCADA and IT systems is porous, and the consequences of that exposure are growing.

How Attackers Move Between Domains

SCADA networks were not designed for hostile environments. Many rely on legacy protocols, unencrypted communication, and trusted authentication mechanisms. On their own, these characteristics already increase risk. But when connected (directly or indirectly) to corporate networks, they introduce an entirely new attack surface.

Lateral movement between SCADA and IT systems often follows a familiar pattern:

• Compromise begins in the IT network, often through phishing or credential abuse.

• The attacker performs internal reconnaissance to locate exposed services or poorly segmented OT assets.

• Using remote management tools or default credentials, the attacker connects to SCADA-facing interfaces.

• Once inside the OT network, they establish persistence, exfiltrate operational data, or attempt to disrupt operations.

These techniques have been observed in campaigns linked to groups such as Volt Typhoon, Industroyer2, and others. The methods are not advanced because they need to be; they are effective because segmentation is already weak or nonexistent.

Why Lateral Movement Is a Strategic Threat

Lateral movement does more than expand access. It expands control. Once attackers move between domains, they gain visibility into critical workflows, user behavior, and security blind spots.

In energy, manufacturing, and utility networks, the impact of lateral access includes:

• Exfiltration of sensitive operational metrics or intellectual property

• Manipulation of process control logic or safety systems

• Use of one domain to launch attacks into the other, masking origins and extending dwell time

• Violation of cross-domain compliance policies (e.g., network separation in NIST, IEC 62443, or national regulations)

The longer the attacker remains undetected, the more deeply they integrate into the infrastructure. The cost of recovery rises with every pivot.

Where Traditional Controls Fall Short

Most enterprise security architectures rely heavily on firewalls, access control lists, and VPNs to define network zones. While necessary, these tools are based on trust.

A VPN grants legitimate access to a remote user. It does not verify intent or prevent that access from being misused. A firewall rule allows traffic between two subnets. It does not guarantee that malware will respect those rules.

Attackers know this. They exploit default configurations, stolen credentials, and overlooked service accounts. Once inside, they do not need to break security. They follow it.

The Role of One-Way Communication in Stopping the Attack Chain

To prevent lateral movement, security architecture must shift from trust to enforcement. One of the most effective ways to do that is by inserting unidirectional gateways between network zones.

Unlike software-based segmentation tools, unidirectional gateways use hardware to control the direction of data flow. They allow telemetry or logs to exit a SCADA environment, but make it physically impossible for commands, queries, or payloads to reenter.

This model is effective because it removes choice from the equation. Even if an attacker compromises a system on the outside, they cannot use that path to move inward. The attack chain is cut before it starts.

Maintaining Operations Without Opening Doors

Industrial networks do not operate in isolation. They require monitoring, data collection, and sometimes vendor interaction. Enforcing domain separation cannot come at the cost of operational visibility.

A well-implemented unidirectional gateway allows:

• Safe export of SCADA logs to corporate SIEMs

• Secure performance monitoring by external teams

• Controlled access to process data for compliance and audit

At the same time, it removes high-risk communication vectors such as remote shell access, bidirectional protocol tunneling, and unmanaged remote sessions. The result is a system that remains connected where necessary, but isolated where it matters.

Stop the Pivot Before It Starts

Preventing lateral movement requires more than configuration. It requires control that cannot be bypassed, subverted, or forgotten.

DataDiodeX: Physical Isolation for One-Way Communication

DataDiodeX enforces one-way data flow using CC EAL4+ certified diode-based hardware. It ensures that SCADA environments can export telemetry or monitoring data without any path back in. This prevents malware callbacks, unauthorized queries, or remote command execution from entering critical systems. For organizations that need visibility without introducing risk, DataDiodeX provides isolation you can measure.

DataBrokerX: Controlled Two-Way Exchange with Policy Enforcement

When bidirectional communication is necessary, DataBrokerX provides secure, protocol-filtered data exchange between zones. It applies strict content validation, Zero Trust access rules, and built-in logging. This allows necessary operational workflows, such as vendor diagnostics or system sync, to proceed without collapsing the boundary between SCADA and corporate networks. Instead of assuming trust, DataBrokerX enforces it at every layer.

Contact our expert team today to find out how you can increase cyber resilience in your infrastructure and prevent lateral movement in case of cyber attacks.